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Abstract
We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary
in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key com-
monalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing
both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of con-
flict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way
economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to
address these challenges.
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1 Introduction
While the study of economics is rooted in analysis of the possibilities for and impedi-
ments to mutual gain from exchange, in the mid-20th century the development of game
theory initiated a flurry of study of more adversarial interactions. Soon after von Neu-
mann’s interest in the strategy of chess led him to initiate the development of game theory
(which he famously expanded upon with Morgenstern in 1944), economists began to use
game theoretic models of strategic interaction to study conflict (Leonard, 2010). In fact,
some of the earliest applications of game-theoretic reasoning were to wartime efforts, as
proto-game theorists developed models that helped the US military optimize its search
for German U-boats (accounting for the fact that the U-boat captains were themselves
optimizing their movements to avoid detection) with von Neumann’s help, even prior to
the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Leonard, 2010, p. 272).1
This anecdote hints at key features of the economic approach to the study of conflict:
economists tend to work with formal models of behavior in which decision-makers have
well-defined objective (utility) functions. These models seek to define mutually optimal
behavior (equilibria) such that decision-makers who consciously weigh the marginal costs
and benefits of their actions, accounting for the fact that their adversaries are doing the
same, will be unable to unilaterally change their strategies to their benefit. As Schelling
(1960) put it, “[t]he advantage of cultivating the area of ‘strategy’ for theoretical devel-
opment is not that, of all possible approaches it is the one that evidently stays closest
to the truth, but that the assumption of rational behavior is a productive one” (p. 4, empha-
sis added). When considering the decision to enter a conflict, or how to behave once a
conflict has begun, economic models describe agents whose choices are shaped solely (or
at least primarily) by incentives. Thus economic models of the outbreak of conflict tend
to look for changes in the value of contestable resources (that increase the benefit of vi-
1Related work continued at the RAND Corporation during the Cold War, as game theory gained a
wider audience among mathematicians, statisticians, and economists at the intersection of government and
industry.
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olently monopolizing those resources), or for changes in the capacity of some group to
defend its existing resources (that reduce the cost of conflict for potential attackers). Sim-
ilarly, models of the duration and intensity of conflict hinge on contestants’ gains from
(and likelihood of) victory.
In recent years, models of conflict have begun to incorporate alternative assumptions
about the preferences or information-processing abilities of agents in an attempt to more
nearly capture the actual decision-making processes of individuals facing conflict. In such
models, agents are nevertheless typically assumed to choose an optimal action, given
whatever additional constraints are imposed by the modeler. For example, modelers have
assumed that some individuals gain additional utility from the simple fact of winning,
independent of the prize won, as a potential account of high conflict expenditures (see
Cox et al. (1988) for a theoretical treatment, Goeree et al. (2002) for an empirical strategy
to identify the joy of winning, and Sheremeta (2010) for an experimental method directly
measuring joy of winning). In a related direction, increasing attention has been paid to
the behavioral consequences of conflict, as for example, in recent evidence that conflict can
induce a preference for certainty and/or encourage cooperation (Callen et al., 2014; Bauer
et al., 2016).
In this survey, we describe the key theories of war and conflict developed by economists,
as well as recent trends in the study of conflict in prominent economics journals, and we
conclude by suggesting directions for future research. Table 1 summarizes the economic
approach to the theory of conflict. We begin by providing a definition of conflict that
allows us to clearly delineate which sorts of interactions we have in mind. Following
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) we define conflict as a situation in which agents choose
inputs that are costly, both to themselves and relative to some socially efficient optimum,
in pursuit of private payoffs framed as wins and losses. Early models of conflict assumed
these input costs were sunk, and looked at the strategic allocation of sunk resources (such
as Colonel Blotto games); later models endogenized the input decision with explicit costs
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(as in all-pay auctions), or implicit opportunity costs (as in the foregone domestic produc-
tion in guns-versus-butter models). Such a definition excludes cases where competition
between agents is efficiency-enhancing, particularly industrial organization (IO) mod-
els of price wars, Cournot, and Bertrand competition in which the competitive choices
of firms reduce prices towards the (Pareto efficient) competitive equilibrium. We will
however discuss IO studies where the nature of competition fits our definition of con-
flict above, such as R&D contests or wars-of-attrition. Principal-agent models are also
excluded from this review because, although the agent’s effort is individually costly, it
is socially efficient. However, we do cite some seminal papers in the field of labor eco-
nomics that developed models to analyze principal-agent relationships which were later
applied to conflict generally (such as rank-order and difference-form contests).2
As the study of conflict in economics advanced, economists developed a number of
distinct, but related, models of conflict and worked out their implications in detail. For ex-
ample, Tullock (1980) introduced a workhorse model of conflict, known as a rent-seeking
contest in which contestants exert costly efforts, and their probability of winning some
prize is equal to the conflict investment generated by their own effort divided by the to-
tal conflict investment generated by all contestants’ efforts. Game theoretic analysis of
this model generates predictions about how the intensity of conflict depends on the prize
value, the asymmetry between contestants, the number of contestants, and so on. In sec-
tion 2 we explore this and other models in more detail. We will see that economic models
of conflict are diverse, but all agree on the key implication that conflict is costly. The
costs of conflict come in three main forms: “1) foregone opportunities, as when guns are
produced instead of butter; 2) attrition of the resources actually devoted to combat, for
example, military casualties; 3) collateral damage to productive resources” (Hirshleifer,
1991, p. 130). Given the costs of conflict, another common theme in conflict theory is
seeking means of reducing these costs or avoiding conflict altogether.
2Each of the models referenced in this paragraph will be outlined in more detail in Section 2.
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Table 1: Research on war and conflict in economics.
Description
1) Definition of Conflict A conflict is a situation in which agents choose inputs
that are (i) costly both to themselves and relative to
some socially efficient optimum (ii) in pursuit of pri-
vate payoffs framed as wins and losses.
2) Foundational publica-
tions in economics
Borel (1921); von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944);
Haavelmo (1954); Schelling (1960); Boulding (1962);
Tullock (1980); Lazear and Rosen (1981); Fudenberg
et al. (1983); Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983); Hirshleifer
(1988, 1989).
3) Methods used to study
conflict/war
To study conflict, economists commonly use:
- Formal game theoretic modeling
- Empirical models using various econometric
techniques
- Laboratory and field experiments with human
subjects
4) Main models of con-
flict/war
Models of war and conflict:
- Contest models: rent-seeking, all-pay auction,
rank-order, difference-form
- War of attrition games: dynamic contest models
- Colonel Blotto games: multi-dimensional contest
models
- Guns versus butter models
- Spatial conflict models
Note: we cite the first instance of a model, whether or not its intended context was conflict as we define it.
In section 3 we review the recent literature on conflict to ask where the field has been
recently. We review recent papers testing the implications of the well-known models of
conflict in diverse settings as well as a strand of empirical literature studying the effects
of conflict on other economic quantities of interest (prices, preferences). We also review
empirical evidence suggesting the need for revision of current theory, in particular in the
direction of more accurately modeling the objectives of contestants to account for moti-
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vations beyond the value of the prize itself. In section 4 we further speculate about the
future of the field and suggest a few possible directions for novel work that will address
important unanswered questions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Models of War and Conflict
In this section, we describe the workhorse models used to study conflict in economics.
We discuss the origins of these models, highlight some of their implications, and briefly
discuss the relationship of the models with existing empirical evidence.
2.1 Contest Models: Rent-Seeking Contest, All-Pay Auction, Difference-
Form Contest, and Rank-Order Tournament
Contest models are among the most common tools to used to describe conflict in eco-
nomics. The two most popular contest models are the rent-seeking contest model of Tul-
lock (1980) and the all-pay auction, which appeared in Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), and
is described in detail in Hillman and Riley (1989). Both models assume that players exert
costly irreversible resources while competing for a prize. To illustrate, assume that there
are two players, i “ A, B, competing for a prize value of v. Players choose inputs xA and
xB and incur a cost cipxiq to do so. The probability of winning is frequently called the
contest success function and is a function of the chosen inputs pipxA, xBq, resulting in an
expected payoff to player A (similarly player B):
piApxA, xBq “ pApxA, xBqv´ cpxAq (1)
The contest success function can take many forms. Generally the probability of win-
ning is weakly increasing in one’s own costly inputs. For example, (Skaperdas, 1996)
describes a contest success function of the form:
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pApxA, xBq “ pxAq
r
pxAqr ` pxBqr if xA ` xB ą 0 (2)
and pApxA, xBq “ 1{2 if if xA “ xB “ 0. Here, r can be thought of as the conflict ef-
fectiveness parameter. In the rent-seeking contest, r “ 1 in (2), the probability of winning
equals the ratio of a player’s expenditures to the sum of expenditures by both players. In
the all-pay auction, r “ 8 in (2), the player with the highest expenditure wins the prize
with certainty.
Some of the early literature on contests - in which contest success is based on relative
rather than absolute costly input levels - was generated in the context of optimal labor
contracts in a principal-agent setting. For example, Lazear and Rosen (1981) described
the normative benefits of a rank-order contest, but their paper is now widely cited in
studies of conflict. Similarly, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) mostly focused on compensation
schemes when they popularized the difference form contest, in which the probability
that a player wins depends on the difference between the players’ expenditures xA and
xB. Hirshleifer (1989) is an early example that explicitly discussed the usefulness of such
contest models to study conflict more generally, including military combat and election
campaigns.
The exact equilibrium predictions depend on the specific parameters and the type of
model in use. For example, in the rent-seeking contest, where r “ 1 and cpxAq “ xA in
equation (2), the Nash equilibrium prediction is for each player to spend xA˚ “ xB˚ “ v{4
in the process of competition (Tullock, 1980), implying that each player should have an
equal probability of winning in equilibrium, i.e., pApxA˚, xB˚q “ pBpxA˚, xB˚q “ 1{2. In the
all-pay auction, where r “ 8 and cpxAq “ xA, the Nash equilibrium prediction is for each
player to randomly choose a level of expenditure from a uniform distribution on the in-
terval [0, v] (Hillman and Riley, 1989), again leading to an equal probability of winning in
equilibrium. This simple formulation of the rent-seeking contest and the all-pay auction
demonstrates the social inefficiency of conflict. Both players could achieve the same prob-
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ability of winning with no expenditures, i.e., if xA “ xB “ 0 then pAp0, 0q “ pBp0, 0q “ 1{2.
However, in equilibrium, own-payoff-maximizing economic agents engage in an unpro-
ductive conflict by spending costly resources. The structure of information is also a critical
component of equilibrium. Amann and Leininger (1996) expanded our theoretical under-
standing of all pay auctions to incorporate incomplete information, and empirical tests
of this environment by Noussair and Silver (2006) demonstrated expenditures above the
equilibrium prediction, in line with a winner’s curse or joy of winning interpretation.
Traditionally, these four contest models - rent-seeking, all pay auction, difference form,
and rank order - have been applied to different areas of economic analysis. For example,
the rent-seeking contest has been commonly used in the study of rent-seeking competi-
tions, while the all-pay auction has been used in lobbying and military applications (see
the review by Dechenaux et al., 2015). Over the years, extensions of these models have
provided valuable theoretical predictions regarding strategic behavior in conflicts (see
the review by Konrad, 2009). One of the most well-established theoretical results is the
incentive effect: the aggregate level of conflict increases in the size of the prize. Another
well-known result is the size effect: the aggregate level of expenditure increases as the
number of contestants increase (although per capita expenditure may actually decrease).
When the contest is between asymmetric players, the weakest player’s optimal costly in-
put is decreasing in the degree of asymmetry between players (Baye et al., 1993, 1996;
Baik, 1994). The reason for this is the “discouragement effect”: weaker players strategi-
cally cut back expenditures when facing a stronger player.
The main predictions of contest models have been tested in the field (Prendergast,
1999; Szymanski, 2003; Connelly et al., 2014). Generally, empirical studies find support for
the main predictions of the theory, such as the incentive effect (Knoeber, 1989; Ehrenberg
and Bognanno, 1990; Becker and Huselid, 1992; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994), the size
effect (Boudreau et al., 2011; List et al., 2014), and the discouragement effect (Brown, 2011;
Berger and Nieken, 2016).
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Theoretical models of contests have also been extensively tested in controlled labora-
tory settings. Most laboratory studies also find support for the main predictions of the
theory, such as the incentive effect (Bull et al., 1987; Van Dijk et al., 2001), the size effect
(Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta, 2011; Morgan et al., 2012) and the discour-
agement effect (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Fonseca, 2009). However, experimental studies
also uncovered a number of important phenomena which are not predicted by the the-
ory. One such phenomenon is over-expenditure of resources (also known as overbidding
or overdissipation): the average expenditure of participants in laboratory experiments is
significantly higher than predicted by the Nash equilibrium. This finding was first dis-
covered by Millner and Pratt (1989), and since it has been replicated by numerous other
experiments (see the review by Sheremeta, 2013). The magnitude of over-expenditure in
some studies is so high that on average participants receive negative payoffs. The phe-
nomenon of over-expenditure has attracted much attention, and a number of explana-
tions have been offered. Some of the common explanations include non-monetary utility
of winning, mistakes, systematic biases, relative payoff maximization, and impulsivity
(see Sheremeta, 2015, for a summary).
2.2 War of Attrition Games: Dynamic Contest Models
While contest models are a popular tool among economists to analyze incentives in war
and conflict situations, most canonical models do not capture the fact that conflicts may
last for a long period of time and a common strategy may be to wear down the enemy over
time. Maynard Smith (1974) was among the first to formally describe what is now known
as a “war of attrition”. In the original formulation of the game, each of two players must
choose a time at which to concede. The return to conceding decreases with time, but, at
any time, a player earns a higher return if the other player concedes first. An alternative
formulation of the game, called the “tug-of-war”, is a contest consisting of a series of
battles, where one player wins the war if the difference in the number of battle victories
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exceeds some threshold.
In general, the war of attrition can be modeled as a dynamic contest in which two
players, A and B, engage in multiple battles for a single prize value of v. The expected
payoff of player A (similarly player B) can be written as:
piAptxtAuTt“1, txtBuTt“1q “ pAptxtAuTt“1, txtBuTt“1qv´ cptxtAuTt“1q (3)
Here, the contest can last for T periods (battles), the probability of winning by A de-
pends on expenditures of both players in all periods, i.e., txtAuTt“1 and txtBuTt“1, and the
cost of expenditure depends on expenditures of player A in all periods, i.e., txtAuTt“1.
The war of attrition game has been studied extensively in economics. One of the ear-
liest theoretical papers by Fudenberg et al. (1983) shows that a player lagging behind
by more than one battle drops out of the contest and, as a result of this discouragement
effect, in equilibrium players compete to gain strategic momentum by exerting most of
their resources at the beginning of the contest (the “frontloading” effect).3 Theoretical
papers have also examined the impacts of the sequence of decisions (Wolfgang et al.,
1994), asymmetry between players (Hammerstein and Parker, 1982; Budd et al., 1993),
varying discount factors (Harris and Vickers, 1987; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986), budget
constraints (Leininger, 1991), intermediate rewards (Konrad and Kovenock, 2009; Gelder,
2014), and path-dependent conflict ability (Bevia´ and Corcho´n, 2010). Commonly, these
studies find that conflict intensity increases in the prize value and the size of intermedi-
ate rewards, and that it decreases in the magnitude of strategic momentum (how far one
player is ahead of the other).
With naturally-occurring data, it is difficult to study war of attrition-style games be-
3In the theoretical literature on dynamic contests “frontloading” is usually referred to as a phenomenon
where most of the resources are exerted in the first battle. This robust phenomenon has been documented in
the case where individual battles are modeled either as all-pay auctions (Harris and Vickers, 1985; Konrad
and Kovenock, 2005) or as lottery contests (Klumpp and Polborn, 2006); however, in the case of lottery con-
tests, frontloading is less pronounced. Also, frontloading is less pronounced when there are intermediate
prizes (Konrad and Kovenock, 2009) or when the final reward is more immediate (Konrad and Kovenock,
2005).
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cause of self-selection, unobservables, and unavoidable endogeneity in dynamic settings.
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. Klumpp and Polborn (2006), for example, pro-
vide evidence for strategic momentum and frontloading in the context of the U.S. presi-
dential primaries. Support for strategic momentum is also found in sports settings (Mc-
Fall et al., 2009; Malueg and Yates, 2010; Irfanoglu et al., 2015). Other recent papers
discussed in section 3 suggest that clever empirical techniques are being developed to
take this model to the field. For example, Augenblick (2016) uses the data from a penny
auction to show that competition in a war of attrition-style contest is more intense and
longer-lasting than predicted (perhaps due to the sunk-cost fallacy).
Given the difficulties of testing the war of attrition with naturally-occurring data, re-
searchers have also conducted a variety of laboratory experiments. The flexibility avail-
able in such experiments allowed researchers to test a variety of implications of these
models, including the consequences of asymmetry between players, fatigue, the length of
competition, intermediate rewards, and contest structure. Echoing the findings of empir-
ical studies, experimental studies find significant support for strategic momentum (Mago
et al., 2013; Irfanoglu et al., 2015). Also, consistent with the theory, conflicts escalate with
the introduction of intermediate rewards (Mago et al., 2013; Gelder and Kovenock, 2017),
and asymmetric contests tend to be resolved in favor of the contestant with the advan-
tage (DeScioli and Wilson, 2011; Oprea et al., 2013). However, contrary to the theoretical
prediction of frontloading, conflicts tend to last too long and remain intense in the latter
stages (Zizzo, 2002; Ho¨risch and Kirchkamp, 2010; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012; Deck and
Kimbrough, 2015), though Ryvkin (2011) finds some evidence of conflict fatigue. Finally,
similar to the findings from all-pay auction and rent-seeking contest experiments, almost
all studies mentioned above find that the average expenditure of participants in war of
attrition experiments is significantly higher than predicted by the risk-neutral Nash equi-
librium.
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2.3 Colonel Blotto Games: Multi-dimensional Contest Models
Perhaps one of the earliest formal analyses of strategic behavior in wars goes back to the
original formulation of the Colonel Blotto game by Borel (1921). In the original game,
two players, A and B, simultaneously allocate their resources across N “ 3 battlefields.
If A allocates xiA and B allocates x
i
B units to the ith battlefield, the player who allocates
the higher level of resources wins battlefield i (similar to the all-pay auction). The winner
of each battlefield receives a prize v, so the objective of each player is to win as many
battlefields as possible (this is also often referred to as the “additive objective”). In the
original constant-sum game, both players have identical endowments of resources, XA “
XB, and resources which are not allocated to one of the battlefields are forfeited and lose
all value to the player. Therefore, the Colonel Blotto game can be thought of as a multi-
dimensional contest in which individual contests are linked though a budget constraint.
The expected payoff of player A (similarly player B) can be written as:
piAptxiAuNi“1, txiBuNi“1q “
Nÿ
i“1
piApxiA, xiBqv s.t.
Nÿ
i“1
xiA “ XA (4)
An equilibrium of this game, first identified in Borel and Ville (1938), is for each player
to use a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, by allocating random, but positive, re-
source levels across all battlefields.
Over the years, the Colonel Blotto game has been extended theoretically to non-constant-
sum games (Kvasov, 2007; Roberson and Kvasov, 2012), majoritarian objective (Szentes
and Rosenthal, 2003), discrete budgets (Hart, 2008), asymmetric resource endowments
(Roberson, 2006), asymmetric objectives (Clark and Konrad, 2007; Holt et al., 2016), asym-
metric battlefields (Gross and Wagner, 1950; Young, 1978), incomplete information (Hortala-
Vallve and Llorente-Saguer, 2010), and alternative contest success functions (Friedman,
1958; Snyder, 1989). These models are complex and difficult to analyze, but perhaps one
of the most robust theoretical results pertains to the impact of asymmetry between play-
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ers on their behavior (Kovenock and Roberson, 2012): stronger players use the stochastic
“complete coverage strategy” (attacking all battlefields with random force), while weaker
players use a “guerilla warfare strategy” (attacking only a sub-set of battlefields).
The most common way of testing the theoretical predictions of a Colonel Blotto game
is by using laboratory experiments (see the review by Dechenaux et al., 2015). Surpris-
ingly, the complex theoretical models perform fairly well in the laboratory. Avrahami and
Kareev (2009), for example, conclude “the results indicate that naı¨ve players can behave,
intuitively, in a way that approximates the sophisticated game-theoretic solution,” while
Chowdhury et al. (2013) write “... it took only one hour for subjects who were unfamil-
iar with this game to exhibit behavior consistent with equilibrium.” At the same time, a
number of experiments document interesting deviations from the theoretical predictions.
For example, experimental studies show that instead of using a theoretical “stochastic
complete coverage” strategy, players often use a “guerilla warfare strategy”, and they
overbid in non-constant sum Blotto games (e.g., Deck et al., 2016; Montero et al., 2016;
Kovenock et al., 2016). This type of behavior can be explained by a multi-dimensional
iterative reasoning (Arad and Rubinstein, 2012), whereby players choose to focus on cer-
tain dimensions of strategy, such as the number of battlefields or the allocation amount to
each battlefield.
2.4 Guns versus Butter Models
In these models, which attempt to integrate the study of conflict into the broader study of
economic activity, agents face a tradeoff between producing goods and taking what oth-
ers have produced (or investing in self-defense). Haavelmo (1954) introduced the tradeoff
between “guns” and “butter” in a classical framework, which was further advanced by
Hirshleifer (1988), among others. To provide the intuition, assume that two players, A
and B, possessing resource endowments, RA and RB, need to decide how to allocate their
resources between production of butter, yA and yB, and guns, xA and xB. Butter is used
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to increase the size of economy of each player, while guns are used to increase the proba-
bility of capturing resources of both players, i.e., yA ` yB. Therefore, the expected payoff
of player A (similarly player B) can be written as:
piApxA, yA, xB, yBq “ pApxA, xBqpyA ` yBq s.t. xA ` yA “ RA (5)
Note that the main difference from the standard contest model (2) is that the prize is
endogenous, i.e., yA ` yB, and the cost of producing guns is the opportunity cost of not
producing butter, i.e., xA “ RA ´ yA. If we assume that the probability of winning the
prize is given by pApxA, xBq “ xAxA`xB , then the Nash equilibrium prediction is for each
player to spend xA˚ “ xB˚ “ pRA ` RBq{4 on producing guns and yA˚ “ RA ´ xA˚ and
yB˚ “ RB ´ xB˚ on producing butter. This result is sometimes referred to as “the paradox of
power”: in equilibrium, the weaker player (with the lower amount of resources) is able
to achieve the same expected payoff as the stronger player by investing relatively more
resources in producing guns (Hirshleifer, 1991; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007). Another
somewhat counterintuitive theoretical result coming from this literature is that conflicts
are more likely to occur in “the shadow of the future”, i.e., as the future becomes more
important (Powell, 1993; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1996; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000;
Robson and Skaperdas, 2008).
Laboratory experiments testing guns versus butter models find significant support for
the comparative static predictions of the theory. For example, Durham et al. (1998) find
substantial support for the “paradox of power” by showing that the weaker players tend
to achieve payoffs similar to the stronger players; see also Powell and Wilson (2008). Tin-
gley (2011) and McBride and Skaperdas (2014) find that conflicts escalate in “the shadow
of the future” by showing that subjects are more likely to engage in destructive conflict
as the future becomes more important, while Kimbrough et al. (2014) find in a laboratory
setting that conflicts are more likely to occur when players are relatively asymmetric.
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2.5 Spatial Conflict Models
In his classic work, Boulding (1962) models conflict over territory by adapting economic
theory on spatial competition (e.g., Hotelling, 1929). Boulding was interested in the geo-
graphic conditions under which one party can conquer another. The basic model is shown
in Figure 1. Two players, A and B, have their centers of power (bases) located at points
A and B. Measured vertically is the military strength of each player depending on how
far they are from their base. It is reasonable to assume that each player’s strength is at
a maximum at the home base, from which it falls in either direction. Both players are
equally strong at location E, and thus this location might be expected to be a source of
conflict and/or to emerge as the border between the two players’ territories.
Figure 1: Boulding’s basic model of spatial conflict.
This basic model can be extended to capture defensive and offensive differences (e.g.,
technologies that alter the slope of the decline, modeling the projection of power), multi-
ple bases, buffer zones (see the review by Anderton and Carter, 2009), as well as multiple
dimensions (O’Sullivan, 1991). The general idea that geographic constraints may shape
the likelihood of conflict is intuitive: the likelihood of conflict will depend in part on the
ability of two parties to reach one another with military force. For instance, the absence of
conflict between European people and South American people until the last 500 years can
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readily be explained by the geographic barriers posed by the Atlantic ocean. Thus recent
empirical work studying the sources of conflict has attempted to account for geographic
barriers to the outbreak of conflict (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016).
2.6 Conflict Avoidance
Throughout this survey we have stressed that conflict is by its nature inefficient, which is
one reason why economists are well-suited to research the phenomenon: we have long-
standing theories that clearly delineate between the outcome which is best for society and
that which is achieved by agents acting solely in their own self-interest.
Coase (1960) was the first to note that in a number of legal cases in which one self-
interested agent caused a nuisance externality to another, that the socially efficient out-
come could be achieved by allocating property rights to either one of the parties and
allowing them to bargain to find a mutually agreeable price and quantity of the nuisance.
Cheung (1969) extended this concept with rigorous theory to demonstrate that in the ab-
sence of transaction costs, any institution could achieve an efficient allocation.
These ideas were later extended and applied to the formal study of conflict using
the models introduced earlier in this section. For example, in the guns versus butter
model described by equation 5, any positive value of guns pxiq for either player is socially
inefficient; both agents A and B could reduce their amount of guns proportionally such
that pipxA, xBq is unchanged and the pie pyA ` yBq is increased, leaving both agents with
greater expected payoffs. Similarly, the efficient outcome in an all-pay auction is to have
every agent bid zero, and in a dynamic war-of-attrition, the efficient outcome is to have all
but one agents exit the market at the first opportunity. Generally, the failure to accomplish
such co-ordination is the result of an inability to communicate or bargain (Coase, 1960),
transaction costs (Cheung, 1969), or in a dynamic setting, an inability to commit to an
agreement once it is reached (Acemoglu, 2003), which may be especially salient in conflict
between states.
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A substantial theoretical literature demonstrates that by solving any one of these is-
sues, conflict could be avoided. For instance, theoretical results suggest that conflicts can
be avoided through communication (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Kreps and Wilson, 1982;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), contracting and side-payments (Hirshleifer, 1995; Muthoo,
2004; Bevia´ and Corcho´n, 2010), centralization Grossman (2002), extensive armament
(Schelling, 1960; Garfinkel, 1990; Grossman and Kim, 1995; Smith et al., 2014), and also
through political systems that emphasize open, rule-governed competition (North et al.,
2009).
Many of the conflict avoidance mechanisms have been studied in the laboratory. Ex-
perimental studies show that, consistent with the theoretical predictions, conflicts can
be avoided through communication (Tingley and Walter, 2011; Cason et al., 2012), side-
payments (Kimbrough and Sheremeta, 2013, 2014), centralization Duffy and Kim (2005),
and armament (Carter and Anderton, 2001; Smith et al., 2014). However, as predicted, in-
ability to commit to a proposed resolution can exacerbate conflict Kimbrough et al. (2015).
Moreover, in the absence of binding enforcement, allowing the formation of endogenous
groups for the purpose of mutual protection similarly fans the flames of conflict (Smith et
al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2013).
3 Recent Trends in the Study of War and Conflict
Here we conduct a systematic survey of papers published in five prominent economics
journals (American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic Studies) in the last 5+ years (2011-
2016) to identify patterns and trends in the literature on the economics of conflict.
To generate an initial list of papers, we searched from the website of each of the five
journals above for all papers which contained the following words in the title, abstract
or keywords: (war, warfare, war-of-attrition, conflict, violence, contest, all-pay, faction, coup,
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revolution). Where they are available, we also included all papers with the following JEL
identifiers: (D74, F51, F52, F54, H56, N4).4 We excluded invited papers and lecture tran-
scripts. This initial list contained 85 papers. We then excluded 13 papers in which a war
or conflict was used as a timeframe or control variable to study an unrelated topic.5 An
additional 23 papers were excluded in which the interaction of interest did not meet our
definition of conflict, most frequently this was because a keyword was used with a differ-
ent meaning in a study of unrelated economic phenomenon.6 Appendix Figures A2-A6
catalog the initial list of papers in each of the five journals of interest with a detailed
justification for each paper we excluded from this review.
In this section, we organize our comments on the 49 papers meeting our search criteria
by the model of conflict featured most prominently. The purpose of this is to introduce the
reader to the cutting edge of research with respect to each class of models we outlined in
section 2. We believe this serves a pedagogical purpose by making it easier for the reader
to refer back and understand how the complex versions of models being used today relate
to their canonical bases.
3.1 Contest Models
Recent research involving contests has expanded our understanding of the established re-
sults mentioned in section 2.1 and further developed the theory to address novel contexts.
The recent literature provides confirmation of some of the predictions of contest theory,
e.g., in empirical work showing that changes in incentives to initiate and participate in
conflict do, in fact, change the likelihood of conflict in a manner predicted by conflict the-
ory (see e.g., Dube and Vargas, 2013; Powell, 2013; Fearon, 2011), and that the size and
4D74: (Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Alliances, Revolutions); F51: (International Conflicts, Negotiations,
Sanctions); F52: (National Security, Economic Nationalism); F54: (Colonialism, Imperialism, Postcolonial-
ism); H56: (National Security, War); N4: (Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation);
source: https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php.
5For example, Jha (2015) studies political attitudes during the English revolutionary war of 1642-1648.
6For example, Goeree and Yariv (2011) study how communication protocol affects social choice out-
comes when agents have either common or conflicting interests, with reference to juries.
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discouragement effects are visible in the context of government lobbying (Kang, 2016).
We also see extensions of conflict models that enrich the conflict environment to consider
variations in the timing of decisions, the information available to contestants, and the het-
erogeneity of contestants (e.g., Fu et al., 2015; Olszewski and Siegel, 2016). Similarly, anal-
yses of conflict have been expanded to consider interactions between different kinds of
contestants, for instance conflicts between state and non-state actors (de Mesquita, 2013;
Powell, 2013; Fearon, 2011; Esteban et al., 2015) or between ethnic groups (Esteban and
Ray, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012; Mitra and Ray, 2014), and a number of papers consider the
influence of third-parties on conflict frequency and outcomes (Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2012;
Ho¨rner et al., 2015; Dekel and Wolinsky, 2012). We describe these papers in somewhat
more detail below.
In a contest between a state and an insurgent group over regional resources, Dube and
Vargas (2013) establish that the nature of the resource’s production technology matters
for the incentive effect; by studying the effect of commodity price shocks on violence
in regions of Colombia, they show that positive price shocks in capital-intensive natural
resources like oil and gold cause the expected increase in conflict from the incentive effect,
but that positive shocks to labor-intensive resources like coffee actually reduce conflict.
The authors propose a labor market driven mechanism in which civilians who might
otherwise have become involved with the insurgency have an improved outside option
in coffee production.
Fu et al. (2015) use the setting of a team contest consisting of multiple pairwise bat-
tles between agents with heterogeneous costs to study the intertemporal nature of the
discouragement effect – a choice to quit in response to an early and perhaps lucky lead
by an opponent. By studying seven specifications of information and timing in all-pay
and Tullock contests, they derive a number of “neutrality” conditions that eliminate the
discouragement effect, in particular it vanishes when players are not repeatedly matched
against the same individual. Olszewski and Siegel (2016) study large contests between
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players, whose degree of heterogeneity is generalized to being drawn from different dis-
tributions. Such a context creates difficulty in computing equilibrium outcomes, but they
theoretically establish that these outcomes can be approximated instead by modeling a
single individual with a continuum of possible types who matches assortatively to prizes.
Contest models modified to explicitly focus on conflict between a government and
civilians have also recently received substantial attention. Briefly, their findings indicate
that state counterinsurgency efforts can cause increases in guerilla violence (de Mesquita,
2013), that governments will undergo sectarian mass killings in order to consolidate power
after a war (Esteban et al., 2015), and that such government violence is more likely when
it has coercive power over rebel forces in the form of an ability to reduce the rebel pay-
off to fighting (Powell, 2013). In considering the other side of this relationship, Fearon
(2011) shows that the threat of civilian violence against the government can generate a
self-enforcing democracy whereby it is in the best interest of the ruler to provide fair elec-
tions and public goods.
There are also recent developments in theoretical contests focusing on the relevance of
third parties to bilateral contests. For example, Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2012) demonstrates
in a two-state “arms race” contest that a cheap-talk extremist can increase the likelihood of
conflict between two states if their actions are strategic complements. Conversely the po-
tential peace-inducing nature of third parties is seen in Ho¨rner et al. (2015), who demon-
strate that non-binding mediation can achieve the same bilateral allocation as a binding
arbitrator if the mediator has an opportunity to collect private information from both
sides. Kang (2016) models lobbying using an all-pay auction of heterogeneous players
and demonstrates that despite a small effect on outcome probabilities, the return to En-
ergy lobbying in the US is over 130 percent. The model provides further evidence of the
size effect (more parties increases aggregate lobbying) and the discouragement effect (a
most influential lobbyist will crowd out others). Dekel and Wolinsky (2012) study a con-
test between an incumbent and rival over corporate control in which it is possible to win
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control not only through share ownership but also by buying votes from board members,
and find that this opportunity generally reduces overall efficiency (by increasing conflict
costs).
Recently, economists have modified group contest models to better understand the
role of ethnic differences in generating conflict. Esteban and Ray (2011) generate a contest
model of group conflict and demonstrate that the equilibrium level of conflict is theo-
retically proportional to a linear function of domestic inequality, fractionalization, and
polarization. Esteban et al. (2012) confirm the expected effects empirically, leading to
a more nuanced understanding of conflict as a mixture of “greed” over private prizes
and “grievance” over the allocation of public goods among groups. Mitra and Ray (2014)
study Hindu-Muslim conflict in India and find evidence that conflict is increasing in Mus-
lim wealth, though they do not claim to know which side is instigating in response.
3.2 Dynamic models of conflict
Much recent work employing dynamic contest models attempts to account for the empir-
ical observation that there are many persistent intergroup conflicts (e.g., Baliga et al., 2011;
Rohner et al., 2013; Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2014; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2012), and this
growing theoretical literature has been complemented by observational studies testing
competing explanations of conflict persistence (e.g., Augenblick, 2016; Takahashi, 2015).
A second strand of literature examining the influence of “obstinate” types and bargaining
posture in dynamic models has improved our understanding about how concerns over
reputation and the beliefs of opponents or third parties can be a driver of conflict (e.g.,
Atakan and Ekmekci, 2014; Embrey et al., 2015).
Dynamic contests are frequently used to model intergroup conflict. Rohner et al.
(2013) emphasize the relationship between trade and inter-ethnic conflict in a search and
matching model. They demonstrate conditions for persistent civil conflicts in a situation
where previous conflicts erode trust between groups, diminishing the propensity to trade
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and increasing the incentive for conflict. While ethnicity is a key contextual factor, this
study focuses on the persistence of conflict or the formation of “conflict spirals”, and it is
shown that coercive peace policies such as external peacekeeping cannot diminish such
spirals in the long term. In a more general but analogous setting of competing teams,
Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2014) generate spirals of conflict over time with overlapping
generations in a dynamic matching model. However, they demonstrate that Bayesian in-
dividuals will eventually end the conflict by experimenting with peace. Similarly, Baliga
et al. (2011) use a dynamic contest to study inter-state conflict in a situation where a na-
tion’s leader first chooses aggression or peace, and then is potentially held accountable to
the preferences of the people (if his nation is a democracy). They derive a common result
in war of attrition models known as “Schelling’s dilemma” where aggressive strategies
are strategic complements, and fear about another player’s type leads to an inefficient
conflict spiral. Gul and Pesendorfer (2012) modify the War of Attrition to a “War of In-
formation” in which two political parties engage in a costly action and choose an optimal
stopping time in their goal of influencing the information or beliefs of a decision maker.
They show that one party becomes more aggressive if its cost decreases or its opponent’s
cost increases, and that the decision maker is better off when the two parties are closely
matched.
Dynamic contests are often applied in non-violent contexts, but in the abstract such
studies can provide hints at the dynamics in play for those who puzzle over observed in-
efficient conflicts even in the presence of a seemingly obvious win-win allocation. Atakan
and Ekmekci (2014) use a war of attrition model in a search and matching wage-bargaining
context in which some proportion of agents are obstinate types to isolate the impact of
uncertainty about bargaining postures on the prevalence of bargaining delays and nego-
tiation break downs. They demonstrate that in equilibrium the two sides either come to
immediate agreement or else must engage in costly delays in order to build a reputation
as an obstinate type to maximize expected lifetime payoffs. In an experimental implemen-
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tation of this model, Embrey et al. (2015) demonstrate that subjects do, in fact, recognize
the role of reputation and mimic obstinate types.
Recent empirical analyses of dynamic contests have illuminated additional factors that
can create conflict persistence. Takahashi (2015) models a war of attrition using the US
movie theatre industry in the 1950s, and demonstrates that the strategic interactions driv-
ing classical findings - in this case the desire to incur the fixed cost of remaining open
in the hope opponents exit the market - could account for less than 5 percent of the ob-
served exit delay, while omitted contextual factors like the degree of competitive intensity
were much more important. As briefly discussed in section 2.2, the empirical analysis of
online penny auctions by Augenblick (2016) demonstrates the robustness of the finding
that individuals are subject to a sunk-cost fallacy in the war of attrition. Using individual
and aggregate bid data he constructs empirical hazard rates and demonstrates that “risk
seeking preferences” and “joy of winning” are less likely explanations for such behavior
than a “sunk cost model”.
3.3 Blotto Games
Multi-dimensional contests were originally formulated to study war, but recently econom-
ists have applied these models to politics and the attack and defense of computer net-
works. Persico et al. (2011) modify a multi-dimensional contest between political parties,
in which decision making is decentralized to a party faction in each region. Within each
region, an all-pay auction occurs when each party faction chooses a costly effort level to
procure a public good for the region, and the effort decision is based on both the region’s
propensity to swing based on winning a public good and strength of the party base. No-
tably, the location of resources in a factional equilibrium is different from that obtained
in other models of distributive politics or other Blotto models. In particular, the factional
model generates non-random biases of effort in favor of party strongholds, a bias that has
been reported in many empirical studies of cross-sectional resource allocations. Of the
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papers included in our survey, perhaps the greatest deviation from typical application
of economic models of conflict is seen in Goyal and Vigier (2014), who modifies a Blotto
game to a situation in which a designer designs and defends a network against an at-
tacker. The designer’s overall payoff is convex in the number of network nodes, and she
decides how to allocate defenses to those nodes; the attacker subsequently allocates re-
sources across nodes to attack. In this general framework, it is shown that a non-random
hub-and-spoke network with defenses concentrated at the hub is optimal for the designer
in a variety of contexts. Both papers demonstrate how changes in the structure of a multi-
dimensional contest can change the optimal strategies.
3.4 Guns versus Butter Models
Recent work using Guns versus Butter models have focused on bargaining, trade, and
other means of avoiding conflict in political contexts and in the process highlighted why
potential bargaining solutions break down or fail to reach fruition in the first place.
Acemoglu et al. (2012) expand our understanding of the discouragement effect by
identifying situations in which war between asymmetric parties can be avoided entirely.
They modify Hotelling and guns versus butter models to a conflict setting between one
state with natural resources and one state with a military, and show that under some cir-
cumstances, regulation of prices and quantities by the resource-rich government can pre-
vent the realization of war through the introduction of intertemporal distortions. How-
ever they also show that under some circumstances, regulation of prices and quantities
can precipitate war in circumstances in which war is avoided in the competitive envi-
ronment. This final result is viewed as evidence of the classical finding that conflict is
frequently unavoidable, i.e., the best response, in an environment of limited commitment.
The guns versus butter concept of strategic resource allocation to prevent conflict has
been extended to model intrastate conflict in a number of recent papers - this is one area
of economics research that very closely overlaps with political science and endogenous
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theories of democracy. Such models involve a situation where an incumbent leader can al-
locate resources in an early stage (e.g., between private consumption, military, and other
public goods), and agents respond with either violence or support. These players can
be thought of as insurgents in the case of civil war, but also as elites or the electorate in
models of political conflict where the leader hopes to avoid a coup or revolution. Besley
and Persson (2011), Berman et al. (2011), Chaney (2013), Bai and Jia (2016), Francois et
al. (2015), and Gennaioli and Voth (2015) all reflect this broad theme of “bargaining” be-
tween state and non-state actors and identify conditions under which changes in resource
allocation will influence the likelihood of conflict.
3.5 Spatial Conflict Models
While we do not see many papers working with spatial models of conflict in the recent
literature, empirical work has begun incorporating spatial variation in the value of con-
testable resources and the location of events to better understand the drivers of conflict.
For example, Caselli et al. (2015) uses geo-referenced data on natural resource location
and border location between pairs of states to establish that the incentive effect is in-
creasing in the ease with which resources can be practically extracted and protected; for
example onshore oil near a border is a greater driver of conflict than equivalent offshore
oil deposits. This is analogous to the incentive effect; only rather than the gross prize size,
conflict is increasing in the net prize size after accounting for the costs of defending and
extracting the resource.
Geo-referenced data is also used in Aidt and Franck (2015), who examine the link
between violent riots and political outcomes during Britain’s Great Reform of 1832. Using
the pre-reform voting record, the authors show that violence within 10km of an electoral
region influences threat perception: first-hand experience of local violence was associated
with a higher probability of electing a pro-reform (Whig) candidate. This finding will be
important for those studying conflict over large areas, the effect of violence on beliefs is
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shown to be sensitive to spatial considerations.
3.6 Empirical Analyses of the Causes and Consequences of Conflict
A substantial literature on conflict has developed that exploits natural experiments, in
which events are viewed as randomly assigned treatments possibly causing variation in
conflicts or economic variables. There also continues to be a healthy literature focused on
“Correlates of War”, both conceptually and using the eponymous dataset.7
Causes of Conflict: Three recent studies have exploited natural experiments to identify
plausibly exogenous variation in variables thought to induce conflict. Dell (2015) exam-
ines violence between the Mexican government and drug cartels and finds that crack-
downs by the right-wing PAN party account for at least half of the recent increases in
Mexican homicides, offering a potential rebuke of hardline political approaches to domes-
tic conflict. Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) show that propaganda can incite Rwandan civilians
to violence and can even have spillover effects on those not reached directly. And while
they do not explicitly model agent incentives, Card and Dahl (2011) demonstrate empir-
ically that there is an increase in reports of domestic violence immediately following an
unexpected loss by home football teams.
Two additional studies of the outbreak of conflict provide further support for the in-
centive effect. Both Crost et al. (2014) and Nunn and Qian (2014) provide evidence that
initiation of a foreign aid program can increase civil violence in a region even when con-
trolling for the endogenous nature of need and conflict and crowding out explanations;
one potential mechanism suggested is the desire of insurgents to limit the effectiveness of
the aid to maintain support among the population.
If we think of violent crime as a socially costly input decision in pursuit of a prize, eco-
7The Correlates of War Project “seeks to facilitate the collection, dissemination, and use of accurate and
reliable quantitative data in international relations” and provides data used in a substantial number of the
empirical papers reviewed here. http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
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nomic analyses can help us understand the incentives to commit such crimes. Aizer and
Doyle (2015) study the extent to which being incarcerated as a juvenile in Illinois causes
an individual to commit violent crimes as an adult, using random judge assignment with
different propensities to incarcerate as an instrumental variable. They find that among ju-
veniles who faced any court case, those who were incarcerated were 6.1 percentage points
more likely to be incarcerated for violent crime as an adult. Similarly to the coffee farmers
in Dube and Vargas (2013), the proposed mechanism is a change in the value of an indi-
vidual’s outside option, in that being incarcerated as a juvenile is particularly disruptive
to human capital formation, making violence less costly to the individual perpetrating it.
Consequences of Conflict: Natural experiments have also been widely used to under-
stand the effects of conflict on a range of variables of interest. The lessons from these nat-
ural experiments include: Civil War-related news influenced prices of US slaves similarly
whether they were old or young, reflecting southern beliefs that Confederate secession
from the Union would be successful (Calomiris and Pritchett, 2016); ethnic conflict led to
decreases in productivity of inter-ethnic teams in Kenya (Hjort, 2014); population shocks
caused by war (and disease) led to greater wage increases in medieval Europe than in
China (Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013); and that incidences of violent anti-Semitism in both
pre-war Germany and WWII USSR had long-lasting negative regional economic effects
(Acemoglu et al., 2011; Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2012).
Two recent experiments combine laboratory methods of measuring preferences with
natural experimental variation in conflict to identify the effects of conflict on preferences.
Voors et al. (2012) perform within-subject analysis of changes in preferences as a result
of exposure to conflict; they do so by experimentally measuring the preferences for altru-
ism, risk, and impatience among the same individuals in Burundi both before and after
local exposure to violence (1999 and 2011). Individual altruism, risk-seeking, and impa-
tience all increase in a community’s exposure to violence, an important consideration to
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post-conflict governments seeking to encourage investment and provide public goods. In
a similar analysis, Callen et al. (2014) demonstrates increasing preferences for certainty
among Afghani individuals exposed to violence.
Other recent empirical papers suggest the existence of economic benefits of foreign
conflict. Dube et al. (2011) studies the effect of CIA coups and coup authorizations on
the stock price of multi-national companies operating in the country of interest, and finds
potential evidence of insider trading through an increase in stock price following a CIA
authorization of a US-friendly coup but before the coup itself. In a similar study, Berger et
al. (2013) examine how CIA operations within a country affected bilateral trade with the
US and find increases in direct foreign government purchases of US goods, potentially
suggesting an economic benefit to the US from foreign conflict.
4 Future Directions
The study of conflict is well-developed in economics with a long tradition in both theory
and empirics. Even so, the last 25 years has seen increasing interest in the study of conflict
among economists. Figure 2 displays conflict-related papers that were published in top
economics journals between 1990 and 2015.8 In this section we describe what we view
as important directions for future research. We appreciate that it is difficult to speculate
about which research agendas may be most fruitful, but we think such speculation is
valuable, particularly as one of the goals of this special edition of JEBO is to inspire cross-
pollination of ideas for conflict research across the social sciences.
Trends in the Incidence of Conflict: Despite the growing interest in studying war and
conflict, some evidence suggests that the actual incidence of these phenomena is at a his-
torical low (see Pinker, 2011). Probably the most important current research question
8Figure A1 in the online appendix shows that the percentage of economics papers with “conflict” in the
title has been increasing since the 1950s.
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Figure 2: Conflict-Related Papers in top Economics Journals, 1990-2015. The figure was
generated based on five journals (American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies) and the search terms (war, conflict, contest, all-pay)
commonly associated with theories of conflict in economics. Web of Science searches for articles within the
given journals with these terms in the title were performed on 29 September 2016. Raw data and additional
charts extending the time trend and normalizing for the total number of economics papers are available in
the online appendix.
in the study of conflict is to identify whether the trend of decreasing conflict is ongoing
and, if so, why it has occurred and whether we can expect it to persist. Existing con-
flict models leave us with ambiguity, and we need to think carefully about how empirical
observations map to theoretical quantities of interest. For instance, should we think of ris-
ing incomes and wealth around the world as increasing the value of contestable resources
(which should encourage conflict) or as raising the opportunity cost of conflict for poten-
tial contestants? How should we think about the role of recent increases in income and
wealth inequality in some countries in terms of the implied tradeoffs between productive
and unproductive (conflictual) investment opportunities? As we have seen, some models
predict that conflict will become relatively more attractive for poorer groups.
Hirshleifer (1995) argues that the answer to such questions is probably best answered
in models that conceive conflict as a continuum, like the guns versus butter models, where
the choice of an agent might be thought of as reflecting a steady-state level of conflict and
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the model’s predictions can be understood to make statements about behavior in the long
run. One productive avenue, then, would be to augment these models by introducing
gains from exchange, potential for growth, and other economic possibilities that reflect
the richness and complexity of alternatives to conflict in the real world.
Triggers of Conflict: One downside of most economic models of conflict is that given
the interpretation of their equilibria as steady-state outcomes, they have little to say about
the triggers of actual instances of conflict. This leaves little room for such models to
make specific policy recommendations designed to avoid particular instances of conflict.
Unfortunately, this “weakness” may be inevitable if it turns out that the triggers of conflict
are unique, context-specific events (e.g., the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand,
the “Soccer War”). On the other hand, some success of spatial models in predicting the
likelihood of conflict due to the geographic distribution of contestable resources suggests
that we may be able to make progress on this front.
Behavior in Conflicts: While the theoretical literature on behavior in a variety of conflict
“institutions” has grown, the empirical literature evaluating these theories remains some-
what less developed. One exception is the large literature on laboratory studies of conflict,
and the findings from these suggest that some of the basic assumptions of economic mod-
els of conflict need to be re-evaluated. We know that the behavior of laboratory subjects
frequently deviates from the optimal behavior of agents in theoretical models. The ques-
tion remains whether the same criticisms can be leveled at these theories (or at the agents,
depending on your perspective) when they are applied to real-world conflict actors.
Do states (paramilitary groups, etc.) behave optimally in the sense of our models or
are they influenced by factors that are not typically considered in the theory? Are con-
flict agents outside the lab driven by emotion or by motivations other than the value of
the contested prize (e.g., joy of winning or the sunk cost fallacy)? Does context matter
in ways that theory based only on the payoff assigned to outcomes cannot predict (e.g.,
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do agents in the field refuse settlements that are “too unequal” even though the resulting
allocation dominates the expected value of conflict)? It seems uncontroversial to suggest
that the answer to all of these questions is “yes”, because conflicts are uniquely power-
ful experiences, often threatening the lives of contestants and offering ample opportunity
for “non-standard” motivations to shape behavior. Nevertheless, these and other ques-
tions remain largely unanswered. Future theoretical work might seek to consider the
implications of alternative objective functions based on experimental findings that indi-
viduals care about “fairness”, “self-image”, “social image”, and “social identity”, while
also considering how to appropriately model such conflict-relevant emotions as “fear”,
“resentment”, “hatred”, “anger”, and so on.
Modeling Conflict Actors: Typically conflict actors such as states are modeled as uni-
tary actors with well-defined sets of preferences (usually monotonic over resources), but
without explicitly modeling the generation of these preferences (e.g., as the outcome of
democratic voting, as a balance of power among competing government actors, as the
induced preferences resulting from a principal-agent problem between sovereign and
bureaucrat, etc.). Occasionally models of conflict include the population of citizens or
a median citizen (as a potential source of election or violent revolution, or as a source of
information). In choosing a strategy, the state’s preferences are generally fixed; the for-
mation and change in these preferences as a result of the citizens’ actions over time is not
explicitly modeled.
Future models of political conflict that endogenize the dynamics between the pref-
erences of a government and the optimal decision making of its heterogeneous citizens
would improve upon the external validity of the literature as it applies to democracies, as
it is reasonable to expect any democratic leader to consider the electoral consequences of
either interstate or civil violence. Another possible implication of democracy for conflict
behavior is that it may result in time-inconsistency or other “biases” since the preferences
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of voters may change in response to new information, chance events, or the outcomes
of ongoing conflict. Similar arguments apply to other forms of government or to other
processes by which governments change, with the broader implication that attempting
to model in detail the institutional structures within which conflict actors are typically
constrained to act might yield useful results, particularly with respect the influence of
institutional “checks and balances” on the likelihood of conflict.
Conflict Resolution: Given the clear implication that conflict is costly and wasteful, the
goal of understanding conflict resolution is paramount. While many models suggest
that mutually beneficial agreements to avoid a looming conflict are typically possible,
the assumptions of such theories, e.g., that contracts are complete and enforceable and
that agents are motivated solely by payoffs, may not be satisfied in practice. Thus there
is a role for models that propose conflict-resolution mechanisms that work within the
actual institutional environment faced by agents in the real world and for models that
acknowledge that conflict resolution possibilities may differ when motivations and rea-
soning processes differ from those typically considered in economic models (e.g., when
agents’ emotions alter either their valuations or their abilities to assess their interests).
Novel Conflict Settings: One setting for conflict that has generally been overlooked by
economists (at least within our search criteria) is cyber-conflict. In the abstract models
of cyber-conflict might involve actions that are costly but generally not observable,9 and
prizes that are not material but take the form of information or a shift in beliefs. Theoret-
ical and empirical analysis of such a setting could provide meaningful insight, and there
is likely appetite for such analysis from policy makers. More generally, new technologies
provide novel settings in which conflicts can occur and may suggest the need for new
models of the kinds of constraints and opportunities for conflict (and conflict behavior)
that these present. Similarly, economists may have something to contribute to the study
9However, see https://cybermap.kaspersky.com/.
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of asymmetric violence between state and non-state actors (e.g., terrorism), though tradi-
tionally this is the purview of political science (e.g., Pape, 2003; De Mesquita, 2005; Fearon
et al., 2007).
5 Conclusion
In sum, the theory of conflict in economics has a rich history and a bright future. From
Borel (1921) and von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) to the broad literature surveyed
above, economists have created and adapted the latest theoretical and empirical methods
to improve our understanding of situations “in which agents choose inputs that are (i)
costly both to themselves and relative to some socially efficient optimum (ii) in pursuit
of private payoffs framed as wins and losses.” (see Table 1). Theoretical treatments of
conflict range from quite general models examining the tradeoffs between conflict and
production to more specific models examining optimal behavior in a variety of conflict
“institutions”. These models vary in many details, but their implications are in many
ways qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict
settings. In recent years an empirical literature, employing both lab and field data, has
developed, in many cases confirming the basic implications of conflict theory (e.g., that
contestants fight harder for more valuable prizes, that asymmetry between contestants
reduces weaker contestants’ conflict expenditure, that valuable resources in more readily
contested geographic areas are more likely to induce conflict, and so on). However, recent
empirical evidence also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally
model conflict (and conflict actors). This body of research has grown rapidly and will
continue to do so, in part addressing the challenges we have described above, and also
by opening up new frontiers that we cannot foresee.
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Appendix (for online publication)
A Conflict in Economics Journals (normalized)
Figure A1: Conflict-Related Papers in all Economics Journals, 1945-2015. Web of Science
search for all articles published with ”conflict” in their titles in all journals categorized by Web of Science as
”economics”. This number is divided by the number of total publications in all economics journals in each
year of this time period to account for overall publication growth.
A.1 Papers Included in Recent Trends
Below is a complete list of papers included in the literature survey reported in section 3.
Each list contains all papers published between January 2011 and September 2016 which
contained the following words in the title, abstract or keywords: (war, warfare, war-of-
attrition, conflict, violence, contest, all-pay, faction, coup, revolution). Where they are available,
we also included all papers with the following JEL identifiers: (D74, F51, F52, F54, H56,
N4)10. Papers in gray are discussed in section 3. Papers in white were excluded, and the
tables include our justification for excluding them from our review.
10D74: (Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Alliances, Revolutions); F51: (International Conflicts, Negotiations,
Sanctions); F52: (National Security, Economic Nationalism); F54: (Colonialism, Imperialism, Postcolonial-
ism); H56: (National Security, War); N4: (Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation);
source: https://www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php.
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